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Much of the advocacy of legislatively-mandated network neutrality is based on a simple 
fallacy—namely, that differing charges to suppliers of content to the Internet for correspondingly 
differing speeds of delivery are inherently discriminatory.  They are not; and an attempt to 
prohibit them would prevent the Internet’s offering a full range of services, with widely 
diverging tolerances for latency.  Preservation of the open end-to-end character of the Internet 
may well, however, require vigilant prohibition of vertical squeezes and other unfair methods of 




Alfred E. Kahn 
 
    I begin with a few propositions on which I am hoping we can agree. 
 
•  The question is no longer whether to deregulate telecommunications—at least not 
whether to discontinue regulating it in the traditional manner and for the traditional 
reasons.  The industry is obviously no longer a natural monopoly and wherever there is 
effective competition—typically and most powerfully, between competing platforms—
land-line telephony, cable and wireless—regulation of the historical variety is both 
unnecessary and likely to be anticompetitive.  In particular, it is likely to discourage the 
heavy investment in the development and competitive offering of new platforms, and in 
increasing the capacity of the Internet to handle the likely astronomical increase in 
demands on it for such uses as on-line medical monitoring and diagnosis, video 
transcription and gaming. 
•  As elsewhere, and generally, deregulation transfers responsibility for protecting 
competition and consumers to the antitrust laws—applicable to both mergers and unfair 
methods of competition—including, most prominently in this instance, prohibition of 
vertical squeezes, foreclosures and discriminations between carrier-affiliated and 
unaffiliated customers. 
•  Jurisdiction over mergers includes the possibility of conditioning approvals on structural 
and behavioral remedies, including, prominently, obligations to interconnect with 
competitors.  Prescription of such remedies, related to possibly anti-competitive effects of 
mergers, must be distinguished from the deplorable tendency of the FCC in recent years 
to exact all sorts of non-structural, performance commitments, some of them only 
remotely related, if at all, to possibly undesirable effects of the mergers themselves.   
Prominent examples have been commitments by the merged entities to behave in ways 
that the FCC regards as pro-competitive and to produce results that, in the extreme, have 
absolutely nothing to do with competition or likely effects of the merger but that the 2 
 
Commission decides are in “the public interest”—such as offering lifeline plans at 
stipulated rates and “repatriating” some stipulated number of outsourced jobs.
1 
•  There is no consensus among economists about the likely sufficiency of competition 
under duopoly—in the present instance, between landline telephone and cable companies 
in the offer of broadband access to the Internet—although evidence of active, facilities-
based competition between the two, such as is actually occurring, might provide 
sufficient basis for deregulation, particularly in light of the aforementioned rapidity of 
technological change.  By the same token, the presence of an actively competing wireless 
provider or providers would, in the mind of most, justify—indeed demand—de- or non-
regulation.  Any analysis of future competition in Internet access must consider the 
possibility—indeed, likelihood—that the cable and telephone duopoly will shortly be—or 




  Calls for legislative interventions to require “network neutrality”—however defined—are 
undeniably efforts to regulate or re-regulate the offer of broadband access to the Internet, in 
specific ways. 
 
•  The aforementioned conditions and considerations—the very large and competitively 
risky investments required, the existing and expanding competitive curbs on monopoly 
power—constitute a strong case for the government keeping its hands off—at the least, 
shift to it the burden of demonstrating the likely  inadequacy of competition, present and 
prospective. 
•  Although there has been legitimate uncertainty for a long time about what precisely the 
advocates of network neutrality have been hoping to accomplish, its advocates have 
                                                 
1 At the instance of two members whose assent was necessary, the FCC attached to its approval of the AT&T-
BellSouth merger such conditions as that AT&T would repatriate three thousand out-sourced jobs to the United 
States by the end of 2007, charge new broadband customers $10 per month, and provide a “neutral network and 
neutral ground link of Internet traffic” for two years.  Federal Trade Commission, FCC Approves Merger of AT&T, 
Inc. and BellSouth Corporation, News Release, Docket No. 06-74, December 29, 2006. 3 
 
apparently settled on the specific goal of prohibiting the providers of Internet access 
“discriminating” among suppliers of content. 
•  To my knowledge, the only specific instance of such discrimination cited by these 
advocates was the refusal of the small Madison River telephone company to carry the 
messages of its VoIP competitor, Vonage, the leading independent provider of telephone 
service over the Internet.  Not one of them, to my knowledge, has mentioned the fact that 
the Federal Communications Commission promptly stepped in to prohibit that obvious 
violation of antitrust principles, as did the Canadian Radio-Television Commission 
(CRTC) in the same situation.  It is axiomatic that the abandonment of direct economic 
regulation shifts to the antitrust laws responsibility for preserving competitions and it is 
imperative that the regulatory or antitrust agencies be prepared—indeed, if it will 
forestall other kinds of network neutrality mandates, instructed—to strike down any other 
such discrimination against or squeezes of competing providers of services or content. 
•  The specific kind of asserted potential “discrimination” by Internet access suppliers that 
the proponents of network neutrality would prohibit is the creation of different tiers of 
online services, offering content suppliers access to an “express lane to deep-pocketed 
corporations, relegating everyone else to the digital equivalent of a winding dirt road.”
2 
 
  In these protests, the advocates seem to be guilty of using the term “discrimination,” 
sloppily, to embrace mere differences in price for different qualities of service.  Strictly speaking, 
discrimination describes differences in price for the same service unjustified by differences in 
cost.  Conversely, differences in price reflecting differences in cost are not discriminatory at all, 
but instead the efficient product of competition, such as was released by airline deregulation, and 
beneficial to consumers—offering them a variety of products or services at the respective 
differing costs of supplying them. 
  I have yet to see a discussion of this issue directly confronting the question of whether 
higher charges for guaranteed faster delivery than of non-prioritized content—routinely offered 
                                                 
2 Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, “No Tolls on The Internet”, The Washington Post, June 8, 2006, at 
A23; but see Kyle D. Dixon, “Rhetoric vs. Reality: Lessig and McChesney on Network Neutrality”, 2006 Progress 




by the Post Office and Federal Express— is truly “discriminatory”:  I should have thought that, 
on the contrary, the faster priority service entails higher incremental cost—(1) the short-run 
opportunity costs of displacing non-premium services, moving them down in the order of priority 
to the “winding dirt road” (a metaphor that I understand grossly exaggerates the—perhaps 
imperceptibly—slower rate of delivery of non-prioritized services) and (2) the (long-run) cost of 
the large investments such as the telephone companies are making in fiber to the premises, in 
order to be able to deliver video services in competition with the cable and satellite service 
providers.  It raises the corollary question also of why charging subscribers for such capabilities 
as taking motion pictures off the Net or on-line gaming for the greater broadband capacity they 
require should be regarded as unacceptable when, as I understand, it would in fact not even be 
“discriminatory.” 
  The only way to avoid unacceptable congestion and degradation of service is to give 
operators the ability to manage traffic on their networks, expediting some data (phone calls, 
streaming video, or remote medical monitoring, diagnoses and treatment) over less time-
sensitive data (such as ordinary e-mail).
3  No one, to my knowledge, disputes the fact that some 
services do indeed require that kind of priority handling.
4 
  Entirely apart from the extent to which differential charges to content providers for 
different speeds of delivery are or are not discriminatory, proponents of mandatory network 
neutrality apparently ignore the reality that actual price discrimination can not be regarded as 
objectionable in itself:  on the contrary, the supply of communications services entails large 
fixed, common costs, the only economic way of recovering which is, typically, genuine price 
discrimination—disproportionately large contributions from purchasers whose demand is 
                                                 
3 As Christopher Wolf and Mike McCurry, opposing mandated network neutrality, presumably on behalf of one or 
another broadband supplier, point out—irrefutably, it seems to me 
 
“A hospital or university sending a live feed should not have to contend with a slower connection 
because neighbors are illegally downloading the latest movie.” 
  Illinois Business Journal, January 2007, page 17. 
 
4 See the lucid and authoritative emphasis on that fact by David Farber and Michael Katz, “Hold Off On Net 
Neutrality”, The Washington Post, Friday, January 19, 2007, page A19, 5 
 
relatively inelastic and charges closer to marginal costs for uses the demand for which is more 
elastic.
5 
  Some advocates of network neutrality (prominently among them large providers of 
content, such as Google and e-Bay, but also, surprisingly, self-styled consumer advocates) 
explicitly oppose the access networks charging content suppliers at all, contending that they 
ought to be required to obtain their revenues solely from ultimate consumers—subscribers to 
broadband service:  access of the content suppliers to the Internet, they aver, should be “free”.  
That contention—obviously self-interested on the part of content providers but misconceived in 
the case of consumer advocates—ignores the fact that access to end customers is itself both 
costly to provide and valuable to content suppliers, as a potential source of advertising revenue.  
They fail to comprehend—or choose to ignore—that the market here is “two-sided”—providing 
Internet content and services to consumers and the attention of consumers to content providers.  
It makes no more sense, therefore—and is clearly misguided for consumer advocates—to want to 
forbid the broadband access suppliers that carry those messages charging the advertisers for 
access to the public than to require newspapers, television broadcasters or cable companies to 
obtain their revenues exclusively from readers, viewers or subscribers and in the process forgo 
advertising revenues.
6 
  Moreover, the misguided attempt of network neutrality advocates to protect content 
providers from “exploitation” ignores the possibility that the shoe may well be on the other foot:  
providers of particularly attractive content may charge access providers for the privilege of 
carrying especially attractive programming to their subscribers.  Scott Wallsten cites the 
enlightening case of ESPN, which charges broadband providers a fixed fee per subscriber for the  
                                                 
5 Michael E. Levine, “Price Discrimination Without Market Power”, 19 Yale Journal on Regulation., pages 1-36, 
2002; William J. Baumol, “Regulation Misled by Misread Theory”, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Study, Washington, DC, pages 29-30, 2006. 
6 As the aforementioned Wolf and McCurry observe: 
 
“Not surprisingly the large-content companies such as Google, Amazon, e-Bay and others are 
leading the lobbying fight. 
They want to use ‘neutrality’ regulations to avoid paying for the huge bandwidth costs they 
consume [sic].” 6 
 
privilege of offering its ESPN360 service.
7  Who is “exploiting” whom in this instance, how 
would a network neutrality requirement apply, and why should it?  
  The two-sided character of the market might appear to cast doubt on the sufficiency of 
competition among the Internet access suppliers to protect providers of content—even ones so 
prized by Internet users as Google—from exploitation, as it might in ordinary markets.  If one of 
the major providers of Internet access—such as AT&T—tried to impose unreasonably high 
charges on Google for transmitting its “messages”, Google could not escape such exploitation by 
threatening or actually transferring its business to, say, Comcast:  in order to reap the rewards of 
its highly successful innovation, Google requires—and in some real sense, deserves—access to 
the customers of both carriers.  In other words, if AT&T is so constrained by the competition of 
Comcast for end-subscribers as to prevent it from extracting from Google the fruit of the latter 
company’s innovation, in its charges for initiating that company’s “messages”, Google might 
still be exploited by a refusal of Comcast to carry those search engine capabilities to its—
Comcast’s—subscribers unless it received some share of the rents. 
  The beauty of the Internet is indeed, as the network neutrality proponents proclaim, its 
“end to end” character:  whatever content—messages, programs, games, search engines—is 
delivered to it is automatically transmitted to all broadband subscribers by the most rapid path 
available, regardless of the ownership of the initiating, intermediate and terminating facilities.  
This reciprocal “peering” has been achieved, as I understand it, by agreement among the several 
carriers in their mutual interest.  Terminating carriers could exercise their putative bottleneck 
monopoly or monopsony power only by denying their subscribers access to desirable 
programming, as well as risking retaliatory—and mutually frustrating—refusal of competitive 
access providers to terminate programs that they originate.  Were that not so, it seems to me 
regulatory intervention mandating interconnection would indeed be required—as was 
recommended by the otherwise highly deregulatorily-inclined Digital Age Communications Act 
Project.
8  I do not see how these exchanges would be assured by vague—most certainly not by 
                                                 
7 Scott Wallsten, “Net neutrality, pricing, and 2-sided markets”, The Progress & Freedom Foundation Blog, March 
1, 2007; and similarly “CBS Reaches Deals with 9 Cable Operators for Compensation to Carry its Programs”, New 
York Times, February 23, 2007, p. C31. 
8 Proposal of the Regulatory Framework Working Group, Progress & Freedom Foundation, June 2005, pp. 24-29.  I 
have elsewhere observed that the recommendation, as formulated, clearly involved a compromise between members 
who would have authorized such regulatory interventions only upon a thoroughgoing demonstration of likely injury 
to consumers, and others, such as I, who would have preferred a stricter, virtually per se condemnation.  See my 7 
 
economically ignorant—prohibitions of “discrimination” or higher charges for “fast” than for 
“slow” lanes:  this is a complex, dynamic market situation in which wise legislators would 
refrain from interfering. 
  In short, what the advocates of network neutrality legislation ought to be concentrating 
their efforts on would be impressing on Congress and the agencies with antitrust authority—
quite possibly including the FCC—the need to ensure that, in the interest of fair and efficient 
competition, the antitrust laws will be promptly applied (1) whenever a provider of Internet 
access discriminates against a competitor (using “discriminate” in the economic sense of 
charging price differentials—for initiating or terminating messages—unjustified by 
corresponding differences in short-term opportunity or long-term investment cost) in such a way 
as to impede efficient competition; and (2) whenever mergers threaten to reduce competition in 
the (two-sided) supply of Internet access to consumers and the eyes and ears of consumers to 
content suppliers. 
  In contrast, and so far as I can see, enactment of a “network neutrality” requirement 
would benefit only professional litigators, hugely. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Telecommunications:  The Transition from Regulation to Antitrust”, Journal on Telecommunications & High 
Technology Law, Vol. 5, Issue 1 (2006), pp. 165-175; also James Speta, “A Common Carrier Approach to Internet 
Interconnection”, 54 Federal Communications Law Journal, March 2002; and outlining an active role for the Federal 
Trade Commission, Philip J. Weiser, Federal Trade Commission Broadband Competition Hearings, February 14, 
2007. 
  Robert Hahn in effect encapsulates the opposing view: 
 
“on interconnect, you clearly have to weigh the benefits against the costs.  The question I’d be 
asking is whether there is a serious interconnection problem NOW.  If not, what is it about the 





  My response is that providing the reassurance that the seamless, end-to-end connectivity of the Internet will 
be preserved, if the mutual interest of the connecting parties proves insufficient, may satisfy the one legitimate 
concern of the network neutrality advocates. 
 